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I. INTRODUCTION
Removal of sperm from a man’s body after death was first reported in 1980, in a
case involving a 30-year-old man who died following a motor vehicle accident and
whose family requested that his sperm be extracted and frozen.2 Since that time,
more than ninety cases have been reported in which family members requested
sperm retrieval from men who died3 or entered a persistent vegetative state4 (PVS),
for the purpose of artificially inseminating a wife, girlfriend, or other woman.5
Several medical techniques for retrieving sperm have been described.6 In at least one
case, such retrieval and insemination resulted in pregnancy and childbirth.7 Media
coverage of this birth has raised public awareness of such sperm retrieval, and
additional requests for it in the future seem likely. Although sperm retrieval could be
performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as medical research, this paper focuses
on cases in which the intent is procreative.

2
Cappy Miles Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State,
34 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 512 (1980).
3

Dead individuals include those whose hearts irreversibly stop beating and those whose
heartbeat is maintained by machines but are brain dead. Brain death is defined as irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. UNIF. DETERMINATION
OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1996). When there is irreversible loss of heartbeat,
sperm retrieval must occur within 24 hours to obtain viable sperm. See Susan M. Kerr et al.,
Postmortem Sperm Procurement, 157 J. UROLOGY 2154 (1997).
4

Dr. Fred Plum, who coined the term “persistent vegetative state” and is an expert on the
subject, has described it as follows: “‘Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning
entirely in terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heartbeat and
pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles
and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either
self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.’” In re Jobes, 529 A. 2d
434, 438 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987).
5
Many of these cases are documented in Kerr, supra note 3. See also Dana A. Ohl et al.,
Procreation after Death or Mental Incompetence: Medical Advance or Technology Gone
Awry?, 66 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 889 (1996); Kenneth V. Iserson, Sperm Donation from a
Comatose, Dying Man, 7 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 209 (1998); Richard Pozda, Sperm
Collection in the Brain-Dead Patient, 15 DIMENSIONS CRIT. CARE NURSING 98 (1996).
6

One method involves surgical excision of the epididymis. See Rothman, supra note 2.
Another approach involves irrigation or aspiration of the vas deferens. See Kerr, supra note 3,
at 2154. Yet another method involves rectal insertion of a probe to induce electroejaculation.
See Murphy F. Townsend et al., Artificially Stimulated Ejaculation in the Brain Dead Patient:
A Case Report, 47 UROLOGY 760 (1996).
7
Jane E. Allen, Woman Pregnant By Sperm From Corpse, Associated Press Online,
REF5618 (July 15, 1998); Louinn Lota, Baby Born From Dead Father’s Sperm, Associated
Press Online, REF5876 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by sudden illnesses, such as head
trauma, rapidly-progressing infections, or asphyxiation. Because the illnesses are
unanticipated, a typical feature of these cases has been the absence of the man’s prior
consent to sperm retrieval and artificial insemination. Despite the lack of such
consent, sperm has been extracted in a number of cases in which requests have been
made.8 Thus, these situations raise a number of ethical issues: Should procreation
by means of sperm retrieval and artificial insemination after death or PVS be
allowed? If so, is the man’s consent ethically required? Should we value the
freedom of wives or others to have sperm retrieved in these circumstances? In
addition, a number of legal issues arise: What is the legal status of a man’s prior
consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS? What is the legal
status of consent by the spouse or other next of kin for such procedures? Should the
man’s consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS be legally
required?
Although a number of additional legal questions can be raised, including issues
of paternity and inheritance, this paper focuses on the legal issues pertaining to
consent, as well as the ethical questions raised above, which need to be discussed in
order to address adequately the legal consent issues. The paper is organized as
follows: first, the current law of consent to sperm retrieval and insemination after
death or PVS is discussed in order to identify gaps in the law—areas that the law
does not address or concerning which it is unclear; second, ethical issues are
discussed that are relevant to deciding what the law should be; and third, based on
the analysis of ethical issues, legal approaches are proposed that attempt to fill the
gaps identified.
We shall see that the law of consent differs in some respects, depending on
whether a patient is alive or dead. Because patients in PVS are legally alive,9 it will
be necessary to consider separately cases involving PVS and those involving death.
Specifically, Part II examines the current legal status of consent to retrieval and
insemination in cases involving patients in PVS. Part III explores the current legal
status of consent to retrieve sperm from dead patients. Part IV discusses the current
law of consent in regard to artificial insemination using the sperm of dead patients.
Part V puts forward and defends views concerning several ethical questions,
including the following: Should sperm retrieval and insemination following death or
PVS be permitted? Is the man’s consent necessary? Part VI sets forth proposed
legal approaches to cases involving patients in PVS, and Part VII states proposed
legal approaches for cases involving dead patients.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO SPERM RETRIEVAL AND INSEMINATION IN
CASES OF PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE
An analysis of the current law of consent, as applied to sperm extraction and
insemination in PVS cases, can be divided into three areas: statutory law; the

8
See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 2; Ohl, supra note 5; Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 28, 1999, at 62.
9

Patients in PVS have at least some brain stem activity. See, e.g., The Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1499, 1500 (1994). Thus, they do not meet the criterion for brain death, which requires
irreversible cessation of functioning of the entire brain. See supra note 3.
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common law of consent to medical treatment; and the right to consent to (or refuse)
medical treatment implied by the constitutional right to privacy.
Two types of statutes might initially seem to be relevant to the consent situation
in question: laws that establish the legal validity of Living Wills; and laws that
establish Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPAHC). These statutes
establish two types of advance directives that enable patients to express their wishes
concerning medical treatment in the event they become mentally incompetent to
participate in decisions. Living Wills allow patients to specify those life-sustaining
medical procedures they would want provided and those they would want withheld,
should they become terminally ill.10 A signed and valid living will constitutes
evidence of a patient’s wishes, and it provides a legal basis for physicians to
withhold or withdraw treatment in accordance with those wishes. DPAHC enables
patients to appoint persons legally authorized to make decisions for them concerning
medical treatment when the patients become mentally incompetent.11 The consent to
(or refusal of) medical treatment by such a surrogate is legally valid when given in
accordance with statutes establishing DPAHC.
However, the wording of these statutes restricts the range of situations in which
they are applicable. Living Will statutes usually are worded to apply specifically to
decisions about life-preserving treatment. For example, the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act, which is the model act for living wills, is restricted in this
manner, as explained in the Act’s prefatory note:
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act authorizes an adult person to
control decisions regarding administration of life-preserving treatment in
the event the person is in a terminal condition and is unable to participate
in medical treatment decisions. As the preceding sentence indicates, the
scope of the Act is narrow... It’s impact is limited to treatment that is
merely life-prolonging... Beyond its narrow scope, the Act is not intended
to affect any existing rights and responsibilities of persons to make
medical treatment decisions.12
Although DPAHC statutes usually are not restricted to decisions about lifepreserving treatment, typically they are limited to decisions about treatment and
diagnostic procedures.13 For example, the person appointed to act on the patient’s
behalf (the attorney-in-fact) might be authorized by statute to make health care
decisions, where “health care” is defined in the statute as “any care, treatment,
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual’s physical or
mental condition.”14 Removing sperm in order to inseminate the wife is not a
10

UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987).

11

See, e.g., Sana Loue, Living Wills, Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care, and
HIV Infection, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 461 (1995); Alice Mead, Durable Powers of Attroney for
Healthcare, 39 PRAC. LAW. 39 (1993). DPAHC statutes also allow patients to specify
procedures that they would want provided or withheld. See Loue, at 468.
12

UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (Prefatory Note), 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987).

13

Loue, supra note 11, at 467. Mead, supra note 11, at 40.

14

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201, 202 (1996). See also UNIF. LAW
COMMISSIONERS’ MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT §§ 1, 6, 9 pt. 1 U.L.A. 453 (1988).
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diagnostic procedure, and it is not treatment for the man in PVS. Because of their
wording, Living Will and DPAHC statutes cannot reasonably be interpreted as
applying to sperm retrieval or artificial insemination.
It might be asked whether the more general Durable Power of Attorney (DPA)
statutes could be used to create an authority to consent to sperm retrieval and
insemination after PVS. After all, courts have recognized DPA statutes as a device
for appointing surrogate decision makers for health care.15 In reply, we should keep
in mind a precept of the law of agency, according to which an agent cannot do what
the principal is not authorized to do.16 A question that needs to be explored is
whether a patient is authorized under current law to consent (in advance) to sperm
retrieval and insemination after onset of PVS. This will be discussed in the
following sections.
A. Common Law of Informed Consent and Advance Directives
In addition to advance directives that are given validity by statute, advance
directives are recognized in common law. These nonstatutory advance directives
generally fall into two categories: living wills executed by patients in states that lack
living will statutes; and conversations between patients and others, in which patients
express their wishes concerning future treatment.17 The basis of these nonstatutory
directives is the common law doctrine of informed consent, which recognizes the
right of mentally competent persons to decide what medical procedures will be
performed upon their bodies.18 As stated by Justice Cardozo, “Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”19 Courts have recognized
that a logical corollary of the right to informed consent is the right to refuse
treatment.20 Moreover, courts have held that the onset of mental incompetence does
not negate a person’s interest in refusing medical treatment.21 Thus, a number of
courts have held that life-preserving medical treatment may be withheld or
withdrawn from mentally incompetent patients when there is sufficient evidence, in
the form of written or verbal statements by the patient when previously competent,

15

In re Hilda M. Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).

16

3 AM.JUR.2D Agency § 71 (1986).

17

Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Living Wills: Validity, Construction, and Effect, 49
A.L.R.4TH 812, 813-16 (1986); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1985); Alan
Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1497, 1501
(1991). For an example of the former type of nonstatutory advance directive, see John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); for an example of
the latter type, see In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
18

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189-192
(5th ed. 1984).
19

Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).

20

See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222.

21

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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that such withholding is in accordance with the patient’s wishes.22 In light of these
rulings, the American Medical Association has recommended that requests by
competent patients not to receive life-prolonging treatment in the event they enter a
terminal state be documented in the patient’s chart.23
Although prior verbal or written statements by patients have provided the basis
for medical decisions under the informed consent doctrine, one should note the
limited range of factual situations in which courts have applied such advance
directives. Virtually all the cases have involved decisions about withholding or
withdrawing life-prolonging treatment for patients who were terminally ill or in
PVS. No court has been asked to rule on whether advance directives are applicable
to sperm retrieval or insemination for patients in PVS. Whether courts should extend
the doctrine of advance directives to cover sperm retrieval and insemination will be
discussed later in this paper.
B. Common Law Authority of Next of Kin to Consent
In the absence of a Living Will or DPAHC that is executed in compliance with
applicable state statutes, common law holds that the next of kin has legal authority to
consent to the providing or withholding of life-preserving medical treatment for
mentally incompetent patients.24 However, decisions by the next of kin must follow
certain principles, referred to as the “substituted judgment standard” and the “best
interests standard”. The substituted judgment standard most clearly applies in cases
involving patients who previously were mentally competent. According to this
standard, the next of kin should attempt to determine what course of medical
treatment the patient, if competent, would choose.25 This implies that if the wishes
of the previously competent patient are known, they should be followed. If the
patient’s wishes concerning provision of life-preserving treatment are unknown, then
the best interests standard applies, according to which the next of kin should attempt
to make the decision that best promotes the welfare of the patient.26
In principle, it would be possible to use the substituted judgment standard to
decide in favor of sperm retrieval and insemination, assuming the patient had
previously expressed a desire to have these procedures performed. If the patient has
not expressed his wishes, then the question arises as to whether the best interests
standard could provide a basis for sperm retrieval and insemination. In such

22
See e.g., In re Eichner 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; In re Lydia
E. Hall Hospital, 455 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (1982). Exceptions to the rule of permitting treatment
refusal are put forward in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.
2d 417, 425-27 (Mass. 1977).
23
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, § 2.22 at 67 (1998). See also
David Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, 263 JAMA 2365 (1990).
24

See, e.g., Sarno, supra note 17, at 815; Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), aff’’d 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Kennedy Hospital, 452 So.2d 921.
25

Sarno, supra note 17, at 815; Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209.

26

Lawrence W. Vernaglia, Annotation, Propriety of, and Liability Related to, Issuance or
Enforcement of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Orders, 46 A.L.R.5TH 793, 804-5 (1997); Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209.
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circumstances, it would be difficult to argue that the patient’s best interests requires
the carrying out of sperm extraction and insemination. Because his wishes are
unknown, there is no way to know whether such procedures would satisfy a desire he
might have had. Because he is permanently unconscious, he would never derive
satisfaction or benefit from an awareness of such procedures being carried out.
Thus, it is doubtful that the best interests standard could be used in this way.
Although the substituted judgment standard could in principle be used, it should
be pointed out that this standard has only been applied by courts in a limited range of
situations. Again, all the reported cases have focused on decisions about
withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment for patients who were
terminally ill or in PVS. No court has ruled on whether the substituted judgment
doctrine is applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination for patients in PVS.
Whether courts should apply the substituted judgment standard in such cases will
also be explored later in this paper.
C. Persistent Vegetative State and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court first articulated the right to privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut, which held that married couples have a constitutional right to use
contraceptives.27 In Roe v. Wade, the Court extended the right to privacy to cover a
woman’s decision to abort a pregnancy.28 Although these cases pertain to freedom to
avoid procreation—through contraception and abortion—other Supreme Court cases
indicate that there is a constitutionally protected interest in freedom to procreate. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court declared an Oklahoma statute authorizing the
sterilization of habitual criminals to be unconstitutional, stating that “we are dealing
here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”29 In
Loving v. Virginia, the Court struck down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages,
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entails a right to
choose one’s spouse, thus rendering a decision that can be interpreted as protecting
freedom to procreate.30
In addition to cases involving procreation, cases involving withholding treatment
have invoked the right to privacy. In the case of In re Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the right to privacy “is broad enough to encompass a
patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances.”31 In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
explicitly that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment.32 Some courts have based the right of incompetent
patients to refuse treatment on both the common law doctrine of informed consent

27

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

28

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

29

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941).

30

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

31

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.

32

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
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and the constitutional right to privacy.33 The constitutional cases involving interests
in procreation and in refusing medical treatment raise several questions: Does the
constitutionally protected freedom to procreate extend to procreation after an
individual becomes irreversibly unconscious? Does the constitutional interest of a
patient in PVS to refuse medical treatment include an interest in refusing sperm
retrieval?
To summarize this part, Living Will and DPAHC statutes, as currently written,
are not applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination after PVS. It is unclear
whether the common law doctrines of advance directives and substituted judgment
should be extended to such cases. Because it is unclear that the patient has legal
authority to consent, it is unclear whether an attorney-in-fact appointed under a DPA
statute would be authorized to consent. Furthermore, because no statute or court has
addressed these issues, it follows that no statute or court has held that the consent of
the patient is legally required.
III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO POSTMORTEM SPERM RETRIEVAL
Discussion of the current law of consent, as applied to postmortem sperm
removal and insemination, can be organized into these areas: statutory law; common
law concerning the disposition of dead bodies; and the constitutional right to privacy.
The question arises whether any statutes are relevant to the validity of consent to
postmortem sperm retrieval. One might initially think that the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA) is relevant. State laws modeled on the UAGA establish the
validity of consent by the patient or next of kin to removal of organs and tissues after
death. However, the UAGA places restrictions on the purposes for which body parts
can be removed. Section 2(a) of the Act states that “An individual who is at least
[18] years of age may . . . make an anatomical gift for any of the purposes stated in
Section 6(a) . . .”34 Furthermore, according to Section 6(a):
The following persons may become donees of anatomical gifts for the
purposes stated:
1) a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization, for
transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research, or
advancement of medical or dental science;
2) an accredited medical or dental school, college, or university for
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science; or
3) a designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by
that individual.35
Postmortem sperm retrieval and subsequent insemination do not appear to constitute
transplantation or therapy, as those terms ordinarily are understood. Moreover, the
purpose of retrieval in the types of cases under consideration is not medical research

33

Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417.

34

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 19, 33 (1993).

35

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6 U.L.A. 53.
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or education, but attempted procreation using the patient’s sperm. Thus, it is
doubtful that the UAGA in its current form can reasonably be construed as
authorizing sperm retrieval for the purpose of impregnating the widow of the
deceased.
A. Common Law on Disposition of Dead Bodies
At common law, the next of kin has a right to make decisions concerning the
disposition of dead bodies.36 However, this right is defined narrowly, based on the
common law principle that there is no right of property, in a strict or commercial
sense, in dead bodies.37 Courts have use the term “quasi-property rights” in
describing the interests of the surviving spouse or next of kin in controlling what is
done to the dead bodies of loved ones.38 The main purpose of this “quasi-property”
right is not prevention of injury to the dead body itself, but prevention of improper
actions to the body that would offend or cause emotional harm to surviving family
members.39 The right in question has been described as a right to bury the body in
the condition in which it was found when the decedent died.40 It consists of a right to
make decisions concerning burial or cremation, including the time, place, and
manner of interment. In the absence of statutes that specify otherwise, this range of
decisions constitutes the only right the next of kin has in a dead body.41 Examples of
statutory rights of the next of kin to make decisions include the right to consent to
organ removal for transplantation, in the absence of contrary indications by the
deceased, and the right to consent to an autopsy. In addition, even these limited
rights of the next of kin to make decisions about the body can be overridden by court
order or statute when required by the demands of justice or the public good.42 An
example would be legislation authorizing an autopsy without the next of kin’s
consent when death is caused by violence or an accident.
It might be asked whether the decedent’s own wishes concerning disposition of
his body is recognized under common law as authorizing such disposition.
Discussion of this question can be divided into testamentary and nontestamentary
expressions of the decedent’s wishes. To begin, a number of cases have addressed
this question where the decedent’s preferences were expressed orally or in writing
other than a will. Analysis of these cases indicates that “...it has always been
extremely problematical whether a person’s attempted oral or nontestamentary

36

25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 3 at 491-93 (1966).

37

25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 3 at 489.

38

See Thomas L. O’Carroll, Over My Dead Body: Recognizing Property Rights in
Corpses, 29 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 238 (1996). See also Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation,
Statutes Authorizing Removal of Body Parts for Transplant: Validity and Construction, 54
A.L.R.4TH 1214, 1216 (1987).
39
O’Carroll, supra note 38, at 239. See also Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising From the
Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 923-28 (1997).
40

22 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 32 (1988); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for
Wrongful Autopsy, 18 A.L.R.4TH 858, 862 (1982).
41

25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 at 490 (1966); O’Carroll, supra note 38, at 239.

42

See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies §§ 2, 3.
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written disposition of his body will be enforced.”43 Courts generally have held that
the decedent’s wishes should be given consideration, but that the decision about
whether to carry them out should be made in light of additional interests that might
be relevant, which can include the wishes and feelings of the surviving spouse or
other family members, as well as the interests of the public. When the decedent’s
preferences conflict with these other interests, courts generally decide which interests
should have priority on a case-by-case basis, after examining the circumstances of
the particular case. In a number of cases, the decedent’s wishes have been
overruled.44 When the decedent’s preferences are expressed in a will, there still is no
guarantee that courts will uphold them. Although courts have held that a person has
a right to dispose of his own body by will, some courts have permitted the wishes of
the surviving spouse or next of kin to prevail over the wishes of the deceased,
reflecting the fact that there is not a strict property interest in dead bodies.45 Thus,
this body of law does not create a requirement of consent by the deceased, nor does it
establish the decedant’s prior wishes as determinative.
B. Dead Bodies and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
The advent of postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination raises a number of
questions concerning how far the right to privacy extends: Does the constitutionally
protected freedom to procreate extend to posthumous procreation? If so, could a
legal justification for honoring a man’s prior request for postmortem sperm retrieval
be based on this constitutional protection? Similarly, does the constitutionally
protected freedom not to procreate include freedom to refuse postmortem sperm
retrieval? To date, these specific constitutional questions have not been addressed by
the courts.
To summarize, the law at present does not authorize the next of kin to consent to
postmortem sperm retrieval or insemination. Moreover, the law does not clearly
grant validity to the patient’s prior consent to these procedures. In addition, because
no statute or court has addressed these issues, it follows that no statute or court has
held that the consent of the patient is legally required for the performance of these
procedures.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSENT TO POSTMORTEM USE OF SPERM FOR
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Currently there are no statutes that establish the validity of consent to use a man’s
sperm for artificial insemination after he dies. Although the Uniform Parentage Act
sets forth legal rules concerning the paternity of children conceived posthumously, it
does not address consent to the medical procedure of artificial insemination.46

43

Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Enforcement of Preference Expressed by Decedent as to
Disposition of His Body After Death, 54 A.L.R.3D 1037, 1040 (1973).
44

Wagner, supra note 43, at 1040-41, 1057, 1063, 1066.

45
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Moreover, the UAGA, as discussed above, authorizes anatomical gifts only for the
purposes of transplantation, therapy, education, and research.47 Thus, it does not
confer validity to consent by the man or next of kin to use sperm for the purpose of
procreation.
To date, there is only one court decision in the United States that has potential
relevance to the question of consent to postmortem use of sperm for artificial
insemination. That case, Hecht v. Superior Court, involved a bequest of frozen
sperm by William Kane to his girlfriend Deborah Hecht.48 Kane had deposited 15
vials of his sperm in a sperm bank and signed a storage agreement specifying that in
the event of his death the sperm bank should release the vials to Deborah Hecht.
Kane also executed a will in which he bequeathed the sperm and most of his estate to
Hecht, and in which he expressed the intention that the sperm be available for the
insemination of Hecht, should she so desire. Subsequently Kane committed suicide,
and he was survived by two college-age children of his former wife, whom he had
divorced years before. The children contested the will, including the bequest of
sperm to Hecht, in an attempt to prevent the birth of future half-siblings.
At one point in the ensuing legal proceedings, the appellate court overturned the
trial court’s order that the children’s request to have the sperm destroyed be carried
out. In its decision, the appeals court held that Kane had an interest in controlling
the use of his sperm for reproduction. Specifically, the court wrote, “We conclude
that at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to
the extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of his sperm for
reproduction.”49 The Hecht court also discussed, with approval, the decision of a
French court to allow the sperm of a dead man to be used by his wife for
insemination, based on evidence that the man wanted the insemination to occur.50 It
should be noted that the Hecht court did not explicitly state that the decedent’s
previously stated wishes constituted legally valid consent. However, its comments
imply approval of the view that the insemination of Hecht should be legally
permissible. Its decision arguably could provide a precedent that would permit
insemination based on the deceased person’s wishes.
Postmortem use of sperm for artificial insemination raises additional questions
for the right to privacy: Could a legal justification for carrying out a man’s prior
request for postmortem artificial insemination be grounded on the right to privacy?
Could a justification for honoring a man’s previous refusal of postmortem
insemination rest on the right to privacy? These constitutional questions have not yet
been addressed by the courts.
In summary, the law at present does not clearly confer validity on the consent of
the patient or next of kin for insemination following death. However, one could
47
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argue for the validity of patient consent, based on the Hecht decision, provided the
patient’s wishes had been clearly expressed. Also, no statute or court, including the
Hecht court, has stated that the man’s consent is legally required for postmortem
artificial insemination.
V. SHOULD SPERM RETRIEVAL AND INSEMINATION BE PERMITTED IN THESE CASES?
As the above discussion indicates, under current law in the United States no one
has clear legal authority to consent to sperm retrieval or insemination after death or
PVS, including the patient and the patient’s next of kin. Moreover, there is no
existing legal requirement that the patient’s consent be obtained prior to such
procedures. This lacuna in the law needs to be addressed, and it raises the question
of what the law should say about these matters. Should such retrieval and
insemination be legally permitted? If so, who should have legal authority to give
consent, and under what circumstances?
Our answers to these legal questions should be based on our answers to certain
underlying ethical questions: Is procreation following death or PVS something that
should be valued? Should sperm retrieval and insemination in these cases be
permitted? Is it ethical to retrieve sperm from patients who are dead or in PVS but
have not given prior consent? This section puts forward and attempts to defend
answers to these ethical questions, in order to provide a basis for discussing in the
following sections what the law should be.
A. Should We Value Freedom to Procreate (or Not Procreate) After Death or PVS?
To explore whether freedom to procreate after death or PVS should be valued, let
us begin with situations in which the patient has given explicit prior consent to sperm
retrieval and subsequent insemination of his wife. Let us also assume that the wife
agrees to the carrying out of these procedures. The term “explicit prior consent” is
used here to refer to verbal or written consent that the man gives directly to health
care professionals. Although no cases to date have involved such explicit consent,
one can imagine a scenario in which a patient discusses such matters in advance with
his physician. It is useful to begin with this type of situation, in which the physician
has direct knowledge of the patient’s wishes; later we shall consider situations in
which there is absence of explicit prior consent, as well as situations involving a
girlfriend rather than a wife.
To consider whether individuals should have freedom to procreate after death or
PVS, it is necessary to ask whether procreation in this type of scenario is something
that individuals can reasonably value. One approach to answering the latter question
is to begin by asking why procreation is important to individuals in more ordinary
contexts. Here, “ordinary” refers to the more common form of procreation in which
a couple conceives by sexual intercourse and then raises the child who is born. The
strategy being employed is to try to understand why procreation is meaningful to
individuals in the ordinary scenario, and then consider whether any of the identified
reasons also apply when the patient has died or entered PVS. If some of them apply,
they would lend support to permitting attempted procreation after death or PVS, in at
least some cases.
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Research has identified a number of reasons people actually give for wanting to
procreate.51 However, some of the reasons that have been given seem confused or
selfish. For example, some have said that they desire to procreate in order to save a
troubled marriage. This reason can be criticized because it fails to deal with the
cause of the marital problems, and the stresses of raising the child could further
strain the marital relationship. Another example involves people who say they want
to have genetic offspring in order to demonstrate their femininity or virility. This
type of reason seems to be based on the view that women must have babies in order
to prove their femininity and that virility is central to the worth of a man. It can be
criticized for stereotyping sex roles and overlooking ways of enhancing self-esteem
other than having children. Some authors have suggested that the desire to procreate
is always unreasonable, as in these examples.52
Rather than accept this
pronouncement, we should consider whether there are defensible reasons people can
give for wanting to procreate.
At least six reasons have been identified that persons could give to support the
reasonableness of their desire to have genetic offspring. These are reasons that
individuals could put forward in explaining why procreation is meaningful and
important to them: (1) procreation involves participation in the creation of a person;
(2) it can be an affirmation of mutual love; (3) it can contribute to sexual intimacy;
(4) it can provide a link to future persons; (5) it can involve experiences associated
with pregnancy and childbirth; and (6) it can involve experiences of child rearing.53
This is not meant to imply that persons ought to have these reasons, or even that
persons ought to desire to procreate, but only that the desire to procreate can be
defended by appealing to such reasons.
These reasons suggest that having genetic offspring can be valuable to a person,
in part, because it can contribute to one’s self-identity. For example, participating in
the creation of a person can become part of one’s self-identity. Similarly, whether
one has gestated, reared, or obtained a certain type of link to the future can be part of
one’s sense of who one is. These reasons also suggest that procreation can, in some
cases, contribute to self-fulfillment, for it can result in marital love being enriched
and marital intimacy being deepened.54 These considerations help explain why
freedom to procreate in the ordinary context should be valued; namely because
procreation can be important to persons in the ways identified, including contributing
to self-identity and self-fulfillment.
There are other reasons why freedom not to procreate is valuable to persons.
First, it is valuable because it is important for directing the course of one’s life.
Gestating and raising children is a large undertaking that can compete with other
51
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projects and goals in one’s life by placing demands on one’s time, energy, and
resources. Thus, in the ordinary context, self-determination in making major life
choices is promoted by freedom to choose whether to have children (or, for those
who already have children, to choose whether to have additional children).55 Second,
being able to affect the circumstances in which one’s children are raised might be
important to some. Freedom not to procreate permits some to avoid rearing
circumstances they consider undesirable, perhaps to postpone procreation until
circumstances they regard as more favorable occur.
Now let us consider whether these reasons for valuing procreative freedom are
applicable to sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS. A man’s
previously stated wishes might be either that his sperm be used or that it not be used
for procreative purposes after dying or entering PVS. Let us begin with the scenario
in which the man stated that he would want his sperm to be used. Although some of
the reasons for valuing freedom to procreate identified above do not apply to this
situation, it appears that the following reasons can be applicable.
First, such retrieval and insemination could involve participating in the creation
of a person. Such participation can be meaningful to individuals for a number of
reasons. For some, the idea of bringing into being an individual who develops selfconsciousness might be important. For others, the significance of participation in the
creation of a person might be religious; some might regard it as acting as an
instrument of God’s will, while others might see it as fulfillment of a religious duty.
Perhaps not everyone who has children thinks about it in terms of creating a person,
but this is a reason that can be given to justify the desire to procreate. Furthermore,
it is reasonable to say that a man can participate in the creation of a person even
though the insemination occurs after he has died or entered PVS. After all, the man
can take actions while he is mentally competent that will cause the insemination to
occur, and it is his sperm that would be used. Admittedly, the man would never
know whether the attempt to create a person would be successful. Nevertheless, the
plan to create a person and the hope that the plan succeeds could be meaningful to an
individual and could contribute to self-identity.
Second, intentionally having offspring can be an affirmation of a couple’s mutual
love and acceptance of each other. It can be a deep expression of acceptance to say
to another, in effect, “I want your genes to contribute to the genetic makeup of my
children.” Similarly, a plan to procreate even if one member of a couple dies or
enters PVS could be an affirmation of mutual love and acceptance. There have been
cases in which procreation after the death of one member of the couple has been
planned and has had this sort of special meaning for the couple.56 There is no reason
why similar considerations and feelings could not occur in a case involving PVS.
This affirmation and its personal meaning to the couple can be strong even though
they know that, in the circumstances envisioned, one member of the couple would be
“gone”.
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Third, procreation can be valued by some because it provides a link to future
persons. There might be several ways in which such a link could have personal
meaning. Some might consider it important to have a family line that continues.
Others might find it significant to play a role in the continuation of humanity. Such a
link to the future can be created even though conception occurs after one dies or
enters PVS. Although the man would never know whether the link actually
occurred, a plan to create it could have personal significance and contribute to selfidentity.
Thus, persons can give significant reasons for valuing procreation after death or
PVS. Because such reasons can be given, freedom to attempt procreation in such
circumstances deserves at least some degree of respect. Admittedly, plans to
procreate after death or PVS might not play as central a role in a person’s life as does
procreation in the ordinary scenario. In the ordinary context, where one becomes a
rearing parent, procreating usually has a greater impact on one’s life plans, as well as
on one’s self-fulfillment and self-identity. For this reason, the argument for
respecting freedom to procreate in the ordinary scenario is stronger than the
argument for respecting freedom to procreate after death or PVS. Even so, decisions
to attempt procreation after death or PVS can be meaningful to some persons for the
reasons discussed, and this gives the argument for respecting such decisions at least
some degree of strength.
This view disagrees with the idea, expressed by John Robertson, that freedom to
procreate after death has little importance. Robertson points out that experiences
associated with procreation after death would be an attenuated version of the
experiences involved in procreating during one’s lifetime. He further states,
“Indeed, it is so attenuated that one could argue it is not an important reproductive
experience at all…”57 In reply, if procreation were meaningful to individuals only
because it involves experiences associated with gestating and rearing children, then it
would be true that procreation after death or PVS can have little importance.
However, in exploring why procreation is meaningful to persons, we have seen that
other reasons matter as well. When account is taken of desires to participate in the
creation of a person, to affirm mutual love, and to have a link to the future, it is
possible to understand that some plans to procreate after death or PVS can be
important to individuals. A middle ground seems reasonable, between the extremes
of saying that such plans have no importance and saying that they are equal in
importance to procreation in the ordinary context.
A second possibility is that a man would state a wish not to procreate after death
or PVS. Although some of the main reasons for valuing freedom not to procreate in
the ordinary context do not apply to procreation after death or PVS, at least one can;
namely, the desire to avoid bringing a child into being in circumstances the person
considers undesirable for rearing. Some men might be opposed to creating a child
when they would be unable to participate in rearing. It should be acknowledged that
freedom not to procreate after death or PVS has less impact on one’s life than
freedom not to procreate during one’s lifetime. Thus, the argument for respecting
57
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freedom not to procreate when alive is stronger than the argument for respecting
freedom not to procreate after death or PVS. Nevertheless, avoiding procreation
after death or PVS can be important to some persons, and this gives the argument for
respecting those decisions some degree of strength.
B. Argument for Sometimes Permitting Sperm Retrieval and Insemination After
Death or Persistent Vegetative State
Drawing on the above discussion, it is possible to put forward an argument for
permitting sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS, in at least some
cases. Again we assume, for sake of argument, that the man has given explicit prior
consent to health care professionals for extracting his sperm and using it to
artificially inseminate his wife. Let us also assume that the wife wants to have the
sperm removed and to be inseminated. At least two main ethical considerations
support permitting these procedures in this type of situation. First, performing these
procedures would promote the man’s freedom to make decisions when alive and
competent concerning procreation after death or PVS. As discussed above, it is
possible to have good reasons for wanting to procreate after death or PVS. The fact
that good reasons are possible gives us a rationale for respecting freedom to
procreate after death or PVS. Although the reasons are not as strong as the reasons
for respecting freedom to procreate when the person is alive and conscious, they
carry at least some degree of weight and provide a reason for respecting the man’s
wishes. Second, given that the wife also requests the retrieval and insemination,
carrying out these procedures promotes her freedom to procreate. A number of
reasons for valuing procreation in the ordinary scenario could apply to her, including
the following: the procreation in question could permit her to participate in the
creation of a person; it could give her a way to affirm her love for her husband; it
could provide a link to future persons that might be meaningful to her; and it could
enable her to experience pregnancy, childbirth, and child rearing. If procreation in
the ordinary context is valuable in part because it can be meaningful to persons in
these ways, then it seems that the woman’s procreation using sperm retrieved after
death or PVS could be valuable to her for the same reasons. Moreover, the
qualification made above, that the argument for respecting procreation after death or
PVS is weaker than the argument for respecting procreation when alive and
conscious, is not applicable. For the woman, the procreation in question would
occur during a time when she is alive and conscious. Because so many of the
reasons that can be given in the ordinary scenario are applicable, her procreative
freedom should be regarded as having a degree of importance close to, if not the
same as, that of procreative freedom in the ordinary context.
C. When the Man’s Wishes Can Reasonably Be Inferred
The above discussion assumes that the man gave explicit written or verbal
consent to health care providers. Now let us suppose that consent was not given
directly to health care providers, but that there is sufficient evidence to justify a
conclusion that he would have wanted to have sperm removed and his wife
inseminated. Evidence that is satisfactory in this context might include prior
statements made by the man to family members or friends that expressed his wishes
concerning sperm retrieval after death or PVS, or it might consist of a prior written
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statement prepared when he was mentally competent and witnessed by others.58 Let
us also assume, as before, that the wife wants sperm removed and to be artificially
inseminated. The question arises as to whether sperm retrieval and insemination
should also be permitted in this type of situation. It can be argued that the
procedures should be permitted, based on the same ethical argument given above,
and also on an analogy to discontinuing life-preserving treatment for patients in
PVS.
The ethical argument given above applies not only when there is explicit prior
consent, but also when there is sufficient evidence to infer that the man would want
retrieval and insemination. We have seen that it is possible to have good reasons for
wanting to procreate after death or PVS. Acting in accordance with the man’s
reasonably inferred wishes would respect his freedom to make decisions concerning
procreation after death or PVS. Assuming the wife also wants the retrieval and
insemination, performing these procedures would respect her procreative freedom.
This type of situation is analogous to those involving decisions about lifepreserving treatment for patients in PVS. In particular, consider cases in which
patients in PVS have not previously discussed withholding life-prolonging treatment
with their physicians. In such circumstances, it is ethically appropriate to ask
families whether patients have a Living Will or had engaged in conversations in
which they expressed their wishes about life-sustaining treatment. If there is
sufficient evidence that the patient would want treatment withheld, then respect for
those wishes would be a major part of the ethical justification for withholding it.
Similar considerations would seem to apply when the decision is concerned not with
life-prolonging treatment but with sperm retrieval and insemination. Respect for the
autonomy of the previously alive and mentally competent person is an important
ethical consideration in both types of situations. If there is sufficient evidence that
the man would want sperm retrieval and insemination, then his freedom to procreate
would be promoted by performing those procedures. As before, the wife’s freedom
to procreate would be an important consideration, as well.
Similarly, when the man is dead instead of in PVS, the same ethical arguments
apply; respect for the autonomy of the previously alive and mentally competent
person is ethically relevant, whether the man is now in PVS or dead.
D. Is the Man’s Explicit or Inferred Consent Necessary?
An important question is whether the man’s consent to sperm retrieval and
insemination, whether explicitly given or inferred from sufficient evidence, is
ethically required. This question arises in the common scenario in which the wife
requests retrieval but there is a lack of sufficient evidence to infer either the man’s
approval or disapproval. It was argued above that the wife’s freedom to procreate in
this type of scenario is comparable in strength to freedom to procreate in the ordinary
scenario; and it was argued that freedom not to procreate after death or PVS is less
important than freedom not to procreate in the ordinary context. If one relied only
on these considerations, one would conclude that the wife’s wishes should prevail.
However, there is an opposing ethical argument that a person’s gametes, and
embryos created with those gametes, should not be used for procreative purposes
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without the person’s consent, whether explicitly given or inferred from sufficient
evidence. An example of a violation of this ethical precept is the well-known misuse
of embryos at the infertility clinic of the University of California, Irvine. Embryos
were transferred to recipient infertile couples without the consent of the couples who
were progenitors of the embryos, resulting in live births in some cases.59 The
progenitor couples eventually learned about the transfers, and some experienced the
anguish of knowing that their genetic children were born into other families. Yet,
this use of their embryos would have been wrong even if they had not learned about
it and experienced that emotional harm. The reason has to do with the relationship
between respect for persons and the special meaning reproduction can have for
individuals.
As argued above, freedom to make one’s own decisions about procreation is
important in part because of the significant meanings procreation can have for
persons. Decisions about procreation have a bearing on concerns that are deep,
personal, and that go to the core of self-identity. Because of this, respect for persons
requires that we permit individuals to make their own reproductive decisions. To
make those decisions for others without their concurrence, whether explicitly given
to health professionals or inferred from sufficient evidence, is to treat them as mere
means and not as ends in themselves. These considerations apply to sperm removal
and use after death or PVS; even if it does not cause adverse consequences to the
man, use of his sperm for reproductive purposes without explicit or reasonably
inferred consent would be disrespectful. This is the main reason why a wife’s
request for sperm retrieval should not be honored in such circumstances.
E. Objection: Harm to Offspring
A possible objection to the type of procreation being discussed is based on
concern for the interests of the child who would be created. This objection focuses
on cases in which the offspring would be raised by one surviving parent. Because no
father would be involved in rearing the child, it might be claimed that bringing the
child into being would be harmful to the child. In reply, a serious problem with this
objection has been pointed out. Specifically, the objection overlooks the fact that the
action that supposedly harms the child is the very action that brings the child into
being.60 Because the objection fails to consider this, it misuses the concept of
“harming”. To see this, it is necessary to consider what it means to be harmed. Here
we can draw upon Joel Feinberg’s useful and thorough discussion of harming. A key
point is that persons are harmed by an action only if they are caused to be worse off
than they would have been if the action had not been performed.61 The claim that

59

See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Unmanaged Care: The Need to Regulate New
Reproductive Technologies in the United States, 11 BIOETHICS 348 (1997).
60
Carson Strong & Jay S. Schinfeld, The Single Woman and Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 29 J. REPROD. MED. 293 (1984); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); STRONG, supra note 53, at 8597.
61
Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 145, 149-53 (1987); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984). Feinberg
points out that an unusual type of situation is possible, referred to as causal overdetermination.
The possibility of this type of situation requires a modification to the necessary condition

1999-2000]

SPERM RETRIEVAL

261

creating children after the father dies or enters PVS harms the children who are
brought into being, therefore, amounts to saying that the children are worse off than
they would have been if they had not been created. Clearly, there are problems with
such a statement. Some will say that it fails to make sense because it tries to
compare nonexistence with something that exists. Others will claim that it makes
sense but is false. The latter claim is based on the view that sometimes it can make
sense to say that children are worse off than they would have been if they had not
been created; namely, when life is so filled with pain and suffering that these
negative experiences greatly overshadow any pleasurable or other positive
experiences the children might have. For example, if an infant were born with a
painful, debilitating, and fatal genetic disease, it might be reasonable to make such a
statement. The view in question goes on to point out that the gap between such an
infant and a child raised in a single parent household is exceedingly great. Even if a
child experienced some disadvantages in having only one living parent, that would
not amount to a life filled with pain and suffering. Thus, it can be argued that it is
false that such children are harmed by being brought into existence. Whether false
or incoherent, the claim that the children in question are harmed by being brought
into being should be rejected.62
F. Request by a Girlfriend
Sometimes a request to retrieve the sperm of a single man is made by a girlfriend
or fiancée. It might be asked whether absence of a marital relationship makes it
ethically unjustifiable to carry out the request. It can be argued that the lack of
marriage does not, in and of itself, make the retrieval unethical. To see this, consider
a case in which family members agree, based on previous conversations with the
man about this matter, that he would want retrieval followed by insemination of the
girlfriend. In this situation, retrieval would promote the man’s freedom to make
decisions about procreation after death or PVS. Also, respect for the reproductive
freedom of the girlfriend is a consideration. The reasons given above for respecting
a wife’s freedom to procreate would also apply to a girlfriend. Because a number of
the reasons for valuing procreative freedom apply to single as well as married
people, there are grounds for respecting procreative freedom regardless of whether
the persons are married.
VI. PROPOSED LEGAL APPROACHES TO CASES INVOLVING PATIENTS IN PERSISTENT
VEGETATIVE STATE
It was argued above that sperm retrieval from patients in PVS is ethically
justifiable and should be permitted, in at least some cases. One obstacle to
permitting such retrieval is the absence of a legal basis for informed consent in this
type of situation. This section discusses various approaches that would make
consent possible and permit retrieval legally to be performed in appropriate cases.
One possible approach is to modify Living Will and DPAHC statutes. States
could modify their statutes so that they cover not only withholding of life-preserving
stated in the text, but that modification does not affect the analysis provided herein. See
Feinberg, Wrongful Life at 150-53.
62

Further discussion of this argument can be found in Carson Strong et al., Ethics of Sperm
Retrieval after Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 15 HUM. REPROD. 739, 741-42 (2000).

262

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 14:243

treatment but also sperm removal and insemination. Of course, many if not most
patients who currently execute these documents are well beyond their reproductive
years and would not use the documents to authorize sperm extraction. However, if
the documents and statutes giving them validity were modified, then younger
persons could make use of them to secure their wishes concerning procreation in the
event of PVS. Those who execute such documents for sperm retrieval might also
express their wishes concerning life-prolonging treatment, thus increasing the
utilization of these documents for that purpose, as well.63
A. Common Law Basis for Consent
Where states do not make such changes to Living Will and DPAHC statutes, the
legal validity of consent could be based on the common law doctrine of advance
directives. The common law recognition of advance directives is based on the
concept that persons should be allowed to exercise self-determination with regard to
receiving or refusing medical procedures in the event of mental incompetence. This
63
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declaration governing the retrieval or nonretrieval of sperm for procreative purposes.
The declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant’s
direction, and witnessed by two individuals.
§ 5. When Sperm Retrieval Declaration Operative
A declaration concerning retrieval or nonretrieval of sperm becomes operative
when (i) it is communicated to the attending physician and (ii) the declarant is
determined by the attending physician to be in a condition of irreversible
unconsciousness.
Third, the title of the current section 3 should be modified to distinguish it from the new
section 5. The title could be changed to: § 3. When Life-Sustaining Treatment Declaration
Operative.
Other provisions of the current Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act would be
applicable to the new sections without further changes in wording, including provisions for
revoking a declaration. See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609
(1987).
Current DPAHC statutes could be made applicable to sperm retrieval by adding the
following section:
Declaration Relating to Sperm Retrieval
The principal, if a male, may place in his durable power of attorney for health
care document a statement authorizing his agent (attorney-in-fact) to consent or
withhold consent to retrieval of sperm from the principal for procreative purposes.
The principal may also include in the document instructions concerning disposition of
the sperm once removed. The inclusion of such statement and instructions in the
document authorizes the attorney-in-fact to make decisions in accordance with such
statement and instructions.
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basic concept appears to apply to any medical procedure that involves a significant
intrusion into the patient’s body. Therefore, courts’ recognition of a right to consent
to or refuse medical procedures provides a basis for extending the right to selfdetermination to sperm retrieval and insemination. Although court decisions to date
have focused primarily on the right to refuse medical procedures, the underlying
concept of self-determination also applies to consent to the performance of
procedures. Thus, extending common law advance directives to sperm retrieval
would be consistent with previous court decisions. Several types of common law
advance directives for sperm removal would be possible: Living Wills executed in
states that lack Living Will statutes; Living Wills that address sperm retrieval
executed in states having Living Will statutes that do not address sperm retrieval;
and conversations between the patient and physician. A conversation in which the
patient tells the physician he would want sperm retrieval could be considered to
constitute explicit prior consent.64
The common law doctrine of substituted judgment could also be applied to sperm
retrieval and insemination. If there were sufficient evidence that the patient would,
or would not, want sperm removal, then the next of kin could speak on behalf of the
patient. Although court decisions involving substituted judgment have mainly dealt
with removal of life-preserving treatment, the underlying concept of patient selfdetermination provides a basis for extending such surrogate decision making to
sperm retrieval cases. Evidence of the patient’s wishes could derive from Living
Wills, DPAHC documents, or statements by family members concerning the
patient’s wishes. If the evidence presented to the physician consists primarily of
statements made by the spouse or other family members, then it is necessary to
consider whether such statements would constitute sufficient evidence to infer the
patient’s wishes.
In exploring what would count as sufficient evidence, let us consider a typical
clinical scenario, in which there is absence of explicit prior consent but family
members state that the man would have wanted the retrieval and there is no
disagreement about this among the family. A problem that arises is that the family
members have a conflict of interest. A surviving wife’s statement that her husband
would have wanted his sperm extracted might be biased by her own interest in
becoming pregnant. Parents of the man, parents of the surviving wife, or other
relatives could also be biased by their own interests or the interests of other family
members. Therefore, it can be argued, such statements do not constitute reliable
evidence of the man’s wishes.
One might seek a solution to this problem of bias by asking whether there are
independent reasons for thinking that the man would agree to sperm extraction. For
example, is it reasonable to assert that a married man with no children would agree
to his wife’s being inseminated with his sperm? One could point out the strong
desire to procreate of most married couples. Specifically, it could be claimed that
most married men want to beget children with their wives. Many men want to have
children who will carry on the family line after they die. Furthermore, a man might
64
If the legal authority of the patient to consent, by means of advance directives, to sperm
retrieval and insemination after PVS becomes established in the future, then DPA statutes
could be used to appoint an agent for the express purpose of consenting to such procedures.
The concern that an agent cannot do what the principal is not authorized to do would have
been overcome.
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agree to retrieval if he knew (somehow) that his wife wanted it. This reasoning is
supported if we make the assumption, which seems plausible at least sometimes, that
a married man would want to promote the interests of his surviving wife. However,
other considerations pull us toward the opposite conclusion. Some men might not
want to beget children in circumstances where they would be unable to take part in
rearing. If they cannot influence the child’s development, then they might not be
interested in carrying on the family line. Because of these conflicting possibilities, it
is difficult to maintain that there are independent grounds for thinking that the man
would consent. If he had never discussed these matters with family or friends, then
attempts to infer his wishes would be speculative.
However, there is a type of situation in which there could be sufficient evidence
to justify a conclusion that the patient would consent, despite the family’s conflict of
interest and the absence of explicit prior consent. If the patient had discussed sperm
retrieval after PVS with his family and had stated that he would approve of it, then
such statements could overcome the problem of family bias, in at least some cases.
Here the evidence would consist of, not simply the family’s attempt to guess what
the patient would want, but accounts of what he had actually said about sperm
retrieval and insemination. One can even imagine scenarios in which families
present signed written statements made by the patient when competent, expressing a
desire for sperm retrieval after onset of PVS. Such documents could be useful to
courts in deciding whether there is sufficient evidence of the patient’s wishes.
Although cases to date have not involved patients who made such statements, verbal
or written, future cases might involve such patients, given that the topic is being
discussed more widely.
In contrast, there might be cases in which family members give differing
accounts of the patient’s previous statements and disagree over whether he would
approve sperm extraction. In such situations, if there are no written statements by
the patient, one might conclude that there is not sufficient evidence that he would
want the retrieval.
The question will arise concerning what standard of evidence courts should use
in determining the incompetent patient’s wishes. With regard to determining the
wishes of incompetent patients concerning life-preserving treatment, the Supreme
Court has held that it is constitutional for states to have at least some degree of
freedom in deciding the standard of evidence to be used.65 A similar argument
would seem to apply to determining an incompetent patient’s wishes concerning
sperm retrieval after onset of PVS; states should have at least some range of freedom
in deciding the standard of evidence. With regard to life-preserving treatment,
several states have required the standard of clear and convincing evidence. This
standard has been held to be appropriate when the individual interests at stake are
both particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money.66 States
that have used this standard have considered it suitable because of the importance of
the state interest in preserving life. It might similarly be claimed that the interest in
avoiding unwanted procreation is sufficiently important to warrant a standard of
clear and convincing evidence in determining whether a patient in PVS would want
sperm retrieval.
65
Specifically, the Court ruled that it is constitutional for Missouri to use the standard of
clear and convincing evidence. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
66

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
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Courts should regard the man’s consent, whether explicitly given or inferred
from sufficient evidence, as a requirement for the legal removal of sperm and
subsequent insemination. This legal approach is supported by the ethical argument,
given above, that sperm should not be removed without the man’s explicit prior or
reasonably inferred approval.
B. Constitutional Right to Privacy
Should the constitutionally protected freedom to procreate extend to procreation
after onset of PVS? Based on considerations given above, it can be argued that it
should. It was shown that some of the reasons freedom to procreate in the ordinary
context is important to persons also apply to procreation after PVS. This provides a
rationale for giving at least some degree of protection to freedom to procreate after
onset of PVS. However, we must consider the strength of protection that is
warranted. The constitutional right to privacy set forth in Griswold and subsequent
Supreme Court cases involving procreation has been regarded by the Court as a
fundamental right. Thus, it is included among an especially important set of rights,
described as being necessary for the “concept of ordered liberty”.67 As such, these
rights deserve a standard of strict scrutiny, meaning that infringement of them is
justified only if there is a compelling state interest and the infringement is narrowly
tailored to meet that state interest.68 We need to consider whether strict scrutiny is
appropriate for the right to procreate after onset of PVS. As argued above, the
interest in procreating after PVS is not as strong as the interest in procreating in the
ordinary context. For this reason, if a constitutional right to privacy were recognized
in this area, it would be difficult to argue that it should be regarded as a fundamental
right deserving strict scrutiny. At best, a nonfundamental right to procreate after
onset of PVS would be warranted, for which a rational basis test would be sufficient
to justify interference.69
The right to privacy of the surviving spouse is a different matter. Procreation
using her husband’s sperm would occur when she is alive and conscious. As argued
previously, her freedom to procreate in this situation should be regarded as
comparable in importance to freedom to procreate in the ordinary scenario. Freedom
to choose the source of sperm for insemination is an aspect of her fundamental right
to privacy. As such, it calls for strict scrutiny. Thus, we reach an interesting
conclusion: when the man in PVS would want sperm retrieval and insemination of
his wife, and the wife wants these procedures to be performed, state interference
requires strict scrutiny, despite the man’s lack of a fundamental right, because the
wife’s right to privacy is a fundamental right.
This does not mean, however, that she is legally entitled to have sperm removed
in the absence of sufficient evidence that the man would want this done. It was
argued above that it is wrong to use persons’ gametes for procreative purposes
without their consent. The man’s explicit prior consent, or sufficient evidence that
he would approve, would be necessary.
67
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500; Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1937); Notes, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 681 (1973).
68

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).

69

See Robertson, supra note 57, at 1040-1042.
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Another issue is whether the constitutionally protected interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment extends to refusal of sperm retrieval. This issue would
arise in situations in which there is sufficient evidence that the man would not want
sperm extraction to be performed, although the spouse or other next of kin is
requesting the procedure. It seems reasonable to conclude that, just as a man has a
right to refuse medical treatment, he should be considered to have a right to refuse
sperm removal. It might be objected that sperm retrieval is not “treatment”, and
therefore the right to refuse treatment does not apply, strictly speaking. However,
the right to refuse treatment is based on a more general right to bodily selfdetermination, which is broad enough to encompass a right to refuse sperm
retrieval.70
If there is a right to refuse sperm retrieval based on the constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment, the strength of these rights remains an open question. In
Cruzan, although the Supreme Court recognized that a competent person has a
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical
treatment, it held that this “does not mean that an incompetent person should possess
the same right,” since such a person is unable to make a voluntary and informed
choice to exercise that right.71 Moreover, the Court refrained from stating that the
incompetent person’s right to refuse treatment is fundamental. On the other hand, in
their dissent Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that the incompetent
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment is fundamental.72 How the Supreme Court
will eventually decide this issue remains to be seen. If the view of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun prevails in the future, then one could argue that the right to
refuse sperm retrieval that derives from the constitutional right to refuse medical
procedures is a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. In that event, one could
argue that a constitutional right to refuse sperm retrieval is derivable from two
sources—a fundamental right to refuse treatment and a nonfundamental right to
avoid procreation. In that situation, the right to refuse sperm retrieval, in effect,
would be fundamental.
VII. PROPOSED LEGAL APPROACHES TO CASES INVOLVING DEAD PATIENTS
If postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination should sometimes be permitted,
then there is a need to establish the legal validity of consent to such retrieval and
insemination. Because the law concerning disposition of dead bodies differs from
the law concerning treatment of incompetent patients, changes in the law that are
needed to make consent possible are different in these two types of scenarios.
Common law has not required that the disposition of dead bodies be in
accordance with the wishes of the deceased, assuming those wishes are known, nor
has it generally recognized the decedent’s wishes as constituting consent which
would authorize medical procedures to be performed on the cadaver. Thus, it
appears that there is no clear precedent in common law that can be used to create in
the decedent’s wishes a power to authorize sperm retrieval. Moreover, the next of
kin’s right is limited to decisions about burial or cremation; any other right of the

70

Schloendorff, 105 N.E. 92.

71

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262, 279-80 (emphasis added).

72

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301-330.
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next of kin to make decisions about the cadaver must be conferred by statute. These
considerations suggest that changes in the common law to authorize consent for
postmortem sperm retrieval are not forthcoming. Changes to authorize such consent
would have to be statutory.
As discussed above, the UAGA is not applicable to postmortem sperm retrieval
for procreative purposes. One approach to legal change would involve states
enacting legislation stating that a man’s explicit prior consent to postmortem sperm
retrieval and insemination constitutes legally valid consent. Such statutes should
also empower the next of kin to consent on behalf of the patient to sperm retrieval
and insemination, provided there is sufficient evidence the deceased would have
wanted such procedures to be performed. Statutes should require that sperm retrieval
from dead patients not occur unless the patient had given explicit prior consent or
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that he would approve. Given the next of
kin’s potential conflict of interest, such evidence should be based on conversations or
written statements by the deceased expressing a desire for such procedures. States
should have a certain degree of freedom in deciding the standard of evidence to be
used. A standard of clear and convincing evidence would be reasonable, given the
importance of freedom to avoid unwanted procreation.73
Although there is no basis in common law for authorizing postmortem sperm
retrieval, at least one case has dealt with postmortem insemination. The Hecht74
decision recognized the interest of gamete providers to decide the disposition of their
gametes following death, and other courts should follow Hecht in this regard. Courts
should recognize explicit prior consent as constituting legally valid consent to
insemination. To be valid, such consent would have to address the question of
73

Such a statute might have the following form:
Consent to Postmortem Sperm Retrieval Act
§ 1. Explicit Prior Consent
A male of sound mind and 18 or more years of age may give explicit consent to
a physician for postmortem retrieval of his sperm and use of such sperm for artificial
insemination of a woman designated by the sperm donor. Such consent, if
documented in the sperm donor’s medical record, shall constitute legally valid
consent.
§ 2. Declaration of Intent, and Consent by Next of Kin
A male of sound mind and 18 or more years of age may execute a declaration
governing the postmortem retrieval or nonretrieval of his sperm for procreative
purposes and, in the event of retrieval, the use of such sperm for artificial
insemination. The declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the
declarant’s direction, and witnessed by two individuals. After the declarant’s death,
the next of kin shall be authorized to consent to or refuse sperm retrieval and
insemination on behalf of the declarant, provided such consent or refusal is in
accordance with the declaration.
§ 3. Explicit or Inferred Consent Required
Postmortem sperm retrieval for procreative purposes, and subsequent artificial
insemination, shall not be performed unless the decedent had given explicit prior
consent in accordance with section 1 or there is clear and convincing evidence he
would have approved the performance of these procedures. Clear and convincing
evidence would include, but is not necessarily limited to, a declaration made in
accordance with section 2.
74

Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993).
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whom the man wishes to be inseminated. Use of his sperm to inseminate someone
other than the person he specified would violate his freedom not to procreate.75
Courts also should recognize the next of kin, or other legally authorized
representative, as having the ability to consent to postmortem insemination on behalf
of the decedent, provided there is sufficient evidence the decedent would have
wanted the insemination to take place. Given the potential conflict of interest, such
evidence should be based on conversations or written statements by the deceased
expressing a desire for such insemination. Courts should not permit postmortem
insemination unless the decedent gave explicit prior consent or there is sufficient
evidence he would have wanted the insemination to occur.
It can be argued that the constitutionally protected freedom to procreate should
apply to postmortem procreation. Some of the reasons freedom to procreate in the
ordinary scenario is important to persons also apply to postmortem procreation. This
provides a basis for giving at least some degree of protection to freedom to have
one’s gametes used for procreative purposes after death. Thus, a legal justification
for honoring a man’s request for postmortem sperm retrieval and insemination could
rest on the constitutional right to privacy. As in the case of freedom to procreate
after onset of PVS, it is difficult to argue that freedom to have one’s gametes (or
embryos) used for procreation after death is a fundamental right requiring strict
scrutiny. Rather, a rational basis test would appear sufficient to justify state
interference with such freedom. In cases where the deceased had wanted sperm
retrieval and insemination of his wife, and the wife wants these procedures
performed, state interference would require the test of strict scrutiny because her
right to privacy should be regarded as fundamental.
Also, the constitutionally protected freedom not to procreate should be
interpreted as including freedom to refuse postmortem sperm retrieval and
subsequent insemination. Some of the reasons freedom not to procreate in the
ordinary scenario is important to persons also apply to procreation after death. As
argued earlier, the ethical principle of respect for persons requires that sperm not be
removed contrary to the man’s wishes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Currently no statutes in the U.S. authorize the patient or next of kin to consent to
sperm retrieval or insemination after death or onset of PVS. Also, there is no basis
in common law for the next of kin to consent to postmortem sperm retrieval and
insemination. The question of whether consent in PVS cases can be based on the
common law of advance directives or the common law authority of the next of kin
has not been adjudicated by any court. Similarly, no court has ruled on the question
of whether a patient may consent in advance to postmortem sperm retrieval.
Moreover, the issue of whether the constitutional right to privacy should be extended
to the area of sperm retrieval and insemination after death or PVS has not been
adjudicated. On the other hand, there is no current legal requirement to have the

75
It is possible that an inferred approval of the choice of recipient could be based on the
man’s previous selection of a person to make that decision for him, as in a Durable Power of
Attorney. For example, a single man might appoint a family member to make decisions for
him concerning sperm removal and insemination after death, including decisions about
selection of a procreative partner.
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patient’s explicit prior or reasonably inferred consent to sperm retrieval and
insemination after death or PVS.
It has been argued in this paper that sperm retrieval and insemination after death
or onset of PVS should be permitted, provided the man has given explicit prior
consent or there is sufficient evidence to conclude he would approve of such
procedures. If this argument is correct, then the law should provide a way for
consent to be given in such cases. There are several ways this could be done: by
passing legislation that explicitly addresses these areas; by extending the common
law doctrines of advance directives and substituted judgment to cases involving
PVS; and by extending constitutionally-based freedoms to procreate (or not
procreate) and to refuse medical procedures to cases involving PVS or death. It has
also been argued in this paper that sperm retrieval and insemination should not occur
unless the man has given explicit prior consent or there is sufficient evidence to
conclude that he would agree to these procedures being performed.

